more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 9263
[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
]
Full Idea
What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.
Gist of Idea
A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality
Source
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4)
Book Ref
Strawson,Peter F.: 'Individuals: Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics' [Methuen University 1974], p.101
A Reaction
As Frankfurt points out, merely requiring the entity to be 'conscious' is a grossly inadequate definition of what we mean by a person, which is typically a being that is self-aware and capable of rational decisions between alternatives.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[a body is necessary for a sef]:
|
4836
|
The mind only knows itself by means of ideas of the modification of the body
[Spinoza]
|
|
5583
|
We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism
[Kant]
|
|
20757
|
The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body
[Nietzsche]
|
|
15583
|
Certainty that I will die is more basic to my existence than the Cogito
[Heidegger]
|
|
23747
|
What is sacred is not a person, but the whole physical human being
[Weil]
|
|
5324
|
Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity
[Ayer]
|
|
5668
|
People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body
[Ayer]
|
|
5173
|
Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body
[Ayer]
|
|
5176
|
Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents
[Ayer]
|
|
9263
|
A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality
[Strawson,P]
|
|
5673
|
If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self
[Cassam]
|
|
16236
|
Maybe our persistence conditions concern bodies, rather than persons
[Olson, by Hawley]
|
|
6669
|
For 'animalism', I exist before I became a person, and can continue after it, so I am not a person
[Olson, by Lowe]
|
|
4936
|
The self is founded on bodily awareness centred in the brain stem
[Edelman/Tononi]
|
|
6144
|
You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software
[Merricks]
|