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Full Idea
It is having second-order volitions, and not having second-order desires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person.
Clarification
'Volitions' are acts of will
Gist of Idea
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires
Source
Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §II)
Book Ref
'Free Will', ed/tr. Watson,Gary [OUP 1982], p.86
A Reaction
Watson criticises Frankfurt for just pushing the problem up to the the next level, but Frankfurt is not offering to explain the will. He merely notes that this structure produces the sort of behaviour which is characteristic of persons, and he is right.
| 22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
| 5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
| 7106 | The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre] |
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
| 2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
| 3223 | Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality [Rey] |
| 20589 | Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |