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Full Idea
It is not true that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if his will was free when he did it. He may be morally responsible for having done it even though his will was not free at all.
Gist of Idea
A person may be morally responsible without free will
Source
Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §IV)
Book Ref
'Free Will', ed/tr. Watson,Gary [OUP 1982], p.93
A Reaction
Frankfurt seems to be one of the first to assert this break with the traditional view. Good for him. I take moral responsibility to hinge on an action being caused by a person, but not with a mystical view of what a person is.
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
| 9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
| 9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |