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Single Idea 9270

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility ]

Full Idea

I use the term 'wanton' to refer to agents who have first-order desires but who are not persons because, whether or not they have desires of the second-order, they have no second-order volitions.

Gist of Idea

A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions

Source

Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §II)

Book Ref

'Free Will', ed/tr. Watson,Gary [OUP 1982], p.86


A Reaction

He seems to be describing someone who behaves like an animal, performing actions without ever stopping to think about them. Presumably some persons occasionally become wantons, if, for example, they have an anger problem.


The 23 ideas from Harry G. Frankfurt

Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]