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Full Idea
I use the term 'wanton' to refer to agents who have first-order desires but who are not persons because, whether or not they have desires of the second-order, they have no second-order volitions.
Gist of Idea
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions
Source
Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §II)
Book Ref
'Free Will', ed/tr. Watson,Gary [OUP 1982], p.86
A Reaction
He seems to be describing someone who behaves like an animal, performing actions without ever stopping to think about them. Presumably some persons occasionally become wantons, if, for example, they have an anger problem.
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
| 9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
| 9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |