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Full Idea
One can ascribed states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience, and they cannot be identified only as subjects of experience.
Gist of Idea
I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others
Source
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4)
Book Ref
Strawson,Peter F.: 'Individuals: Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics' [Methuen University 1974], p.100
A Reaction
A neat linguistic twist on the analogy argument, but rather dubious, if it is actually meant to prove that other minds exist. It is based on his view of predicates - see Idea 9281. If the rest of humanity are zombies, why would I not apply them?
Related Idea
Idea 9281 The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P]
| 7920 | Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P] |
| 7922 | Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P] |
| 7921 | Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P] |
| 9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P] |
| 9263 | A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P] |
| 9281 | The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P] |