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Single Idea 9286

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness ]

Full Idea

Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and not a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, is best explained by their relations to one another, the relations being experiences.

Gist of Idea

Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences

Source

William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], §3)

Book Ref

James,William: 'Selected Writings of William James', ed/tr. Bird,Graham [Everyman 1995], p.110


A Reaction

This view has suddenly caught people's interest. It might be better than the higher/lower relationship, which seems to leave the basic problem untouched. Does a whole network of relations between experiences gradually 'add up' to consciousness?


The 18 ideas with the same theme [what causes minds to be conscious]:

Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid]
Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche]
Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett]
Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau]
Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness [Penrose]
Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex? [Rey]
The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane]
Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers]
What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers]
Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers]
There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R]
Consciousness arises from high speed interactions between clusters of neurons [Edelman/Tononi]
Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth]