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Full Idea
The two main competitors for reductive theories of consciousness are the representational theory (conscious if it represents in the right way), and higher-order monitoring (conscious if it is represented in the right way).
Gist of Idea
Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented
Source
U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], Intro)
Book Ref
'Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness', ed/tr. Kriegel,U /Williford,K [MIT 2006], p.1
A Reaction
Presumably there are also neuroscientists hunting for physical functions which might generate consciousness. The two mentioned here are rivals at one level of discourse. Both views may be simplistic, if complex teams of activities are involved.
9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |