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Full Idea
The self-representational theory of consciousness says that when one has a conscious experience as of a red tomato, one is in an internal state that represents both a red tomato and itself.
Gist of Idea
Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself
Source
U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
Book Ref
'Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness', ed/tr. Kriegel,U /Williford,K [MIT 2006], p.2
A Reaction
This seems to be avoiding the concept of 'higher-order', and yet that seems the only way to describe it - thought steps outside of itself, generating a level of meta-thought. I think that's the way to go. Philosophy is about-fifth level.
| 9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |