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Full Idea
The difficulties with a self-representational view of consciousness are how self-representation of mental states could be possible, whether it leads to an infinite regress, and whether it can capture the actual phenomenology of experience.
Gist of Idea
How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that?
Source
U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §3)
Book Ref
'Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness', ed/tr. Kriegel,U /Williford,K [MIT 2006], p.4
A Reaction
[compressed] All of these objections strike me as persuasive, especially the first one. I'm not sure I know what self-representation is. Mirrors externally represent, and they can't represent themselves. Two mirrors together achieve something..
9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |