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Single Idea 9317
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
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Full Idea
Searle appears to argue that phenomenal consciousness is explained in biological terms, but that biological properties are irreducible to purely (micro)physical ones.
Gist of Idea
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology
Source
report of John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992]) by U Kriegel / K Williford - Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' n1
Book Ref
'Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness', ed/tr. Kriegel,U /Williford,K [MIT 2006], p.7
A Reaction
Searle is very hard to pin down, and this account suggests the reason very clearly - because he is proposing something which is bizarrely implausible. The reduction of biology-to-physics looks much more likely than consciousness-to-biology.
The
61 ideas
from 'The Rediscovery of the Mind'
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9317
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Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology
[Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
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3451
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Meaning is derived intentionality
[Searle]
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3453
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Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
[Searle]
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3454
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Reality is entirely particles in force fields
[Searle]
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3450
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Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind
[Searle]
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3455
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Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
[Searle]
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3456
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Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
[Searle]
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3457
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Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation
[Searle]
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3458
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Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily
[Searle]
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3459
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You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit
[Searle]
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3462
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We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it
[Searle]
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3461
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Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference
[Searle]
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3463
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We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds
[Searle]
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3465
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Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it
[Searle]
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3464
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There is no such thing as 'wide content'
[Searle]
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4088
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Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself
[Searle]
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3466
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Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories
[Searle]
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3468
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I cannot observe my own subjectivity
[Searle]
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3467
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Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense
[Searle]
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3470
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Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better
[Searle]
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3469
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Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same
[Searle]
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3471
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Some properties depend on components, others on their relations
[Searle]
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3472
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Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation
[Searle]
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3473
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Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes
[Searle]
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3474
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If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain?
[Searle]
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3475
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Property dualism denies reductionism
[Searle]
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3476
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Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect
[Searle]
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3532
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Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient
[Maslin on Searle]
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3533
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Is supervenience just causality?
[Searle, by Maslin]
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3478
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Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant
[Searle]
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3477
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If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism
[Searle]
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3531
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Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston
[Searle]
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3479
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The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial
[Searle]
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3480
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We experience unity at an instant and across time
[Searle]
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3481
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Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality
[Searle]
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3482
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Perception is a function of expectation
[Searle]
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3483
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Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision
[Searle]
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3484
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Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality
[Searle]
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3485
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Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component
[Searle]
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3486
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Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones
[Searle]
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3487
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Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained
[Searle]
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3489
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Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background
[Searle]
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3490
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Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs
[Searle]
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3491
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Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background
[Searle]
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3492
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Content is much more than just sentence meaning
[Searle]
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3493
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Memory is mainly a guide for current performance
[Searle]
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3494
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Intentionality is defined in terms of representation
[Searle]
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3495
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Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard
[Searle]
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3496
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A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese
[Searle]
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3497
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If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it
[Searle]
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3498
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Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena
[Searle]
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3500
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Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition?
[Searle]
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3499
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Computation presupposes consciousness
[Searle]
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3501
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If we are computers, who is the user?
[Searle]
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3502
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Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating
[Searle]
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3504
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Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour
[Searle]
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3503
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Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information
[Searle]
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3505
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The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do
[Searle]
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3506
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We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent
[Searle]
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3507
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Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything
[Searle]
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3508
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Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry
[Searle]
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