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Single Idea 9320

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought ]

Full Idea

Higher-order thought (HOT) models treat metastates as thought-like, and higher-order perception (HOP) models regard them as at least quasi-perceptual and resulting from some form of inner monitoring or inner sense.

Gist of Idea

Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception

Source

Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I)

Book Ref

'Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness', ed/tr. Kriegel,U /Williford,K [MIT 2006], p.12


A Reaction

I would understand 'thought' to at least partially involve judgements. The HOT theory (Carruthers) seems to suit epistemological foundationalists, who want truth to enter on the ground floor. This pushes me towards the HOP model (Lycan) as more plausible.


The 16 ideas with the same theme [consciousness as higher levels of thinking]:

Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke]
Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane]
Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche]
Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau]
Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau]
States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau]
Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau]
If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick]
Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick]
Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick]
Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]