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Single Idea 9322
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
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Full Idea
Some higher-order theorists say we have qualitative but unconscious mental states of color or pain (qualia), but there is nothing it is like to be in such a state, which needs higher-order awareness. The meta-states are devoid of qualia.
Gist of Idea
Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like
Source
Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I.5)
Book Ref
'Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness', ed/tr. Kriegel,U /Williford,K [MIT 2006], p.15
A Reaction
He calls this the 'stranded qualia' problem. Clearly one begins to sharpen Ockham's Razor at this point, if the higher-level state isn't contributing something. I don't rule out unconscious qualia. The strength of a real pain is distorted in a dream.
The
16 ideas
with the same theme
[consciousness as higher levels of thinking]:
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5002
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Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind
[Locke]
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4086
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Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception')
[Kant, by Crane]
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23190
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Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life
[Nietzsche]
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7111
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Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself
[Sartre]
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4888
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It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them
[Perry]
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2453
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We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts
[Fodor]
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7885
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The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states
[Papineau]
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7886
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Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered
[Papineau]
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7887
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States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements
[Papineau]
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7888
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Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious
[Papineau]
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8895
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If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present
[Bonjour]
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12586
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Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it
[Peacocke]
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9320
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Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception
[Gulick]
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9321
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Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality
[Gulick]
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9322
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Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like
[Gulick]
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9314
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Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error
[Kriegel/Williford]
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