more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
Some higher-order theorists say we have qualitative but unconscious mental states of color or pain (qualia), but there is nothing it is like to be in such a state, which needs higher-order awareness. The meta-states are devoid of qualia.
Gist of Idea
Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like
Source
Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I.5)
Book Ref
'Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness', ed/tr. Kriegel,U /Williford,K [MIT 2006], p.15
A Reaction
He calls this the 'stranded qualia' problem. Clearly one begins to sharpen Ockham's Razor at this point, if the higher-level state isn't contributing something. I don't rule out unconscious qualia. The strength of a real pain is distorted in a dream.
| 9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |
| 9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
| 9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
| 9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
| 9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
| 9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
| 9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
| 9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |