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Single Idea 9328

[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection ]

Full Idea

I am inclined to think that all conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them.

Gist of Idea

All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them

Source

Keith Lehrer (Consciousness,Represn, and Knowledge [2006])

Book Ref

'Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness', ed/tr. Kriegel,U /Williford,K [MIT 2006], p.409


A Reaction

This strikes me as a very helpful suggestion, for eliminating lots of problem cases for introspective knowledge which have been triumphally paraded in recent times. It might, though, be tautological, if it is actually a definition of 'conscious states'.


The 15 ideas with the same theme [learning about our minds by looking inwards]:

To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer]
Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]