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Full Idea
It is one thing to believe something a priori and another for this belief to be epistemically justified. The latter is required for a priori knowledge.
Gist of Idea
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge
Source
Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §8)
Book Ref
'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.162
A Reaction
Personally I would agree with this, because I don't think anything should count as knowledge if it doesn't have supporting reasons, but fans of a priori knowledge presumably think that certain basic facts are just known. They are a priori justified.
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |