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Single Idea 9335

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts ]

Full Idea

Peacocke argues that it may be a condition of possessing a certain concept that one be fundamentally committed to certain propositions which contain it. A concept is constituted by playing a specific role in the cognitive economy of its possessor.

Gist of Idea

Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed

Source

report of Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992]) by John Greco - Justification is not Internal §9

Book Ref

'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.164


A Reaction

Peacocke is talking about thought and propositions rather than language. Good for him. I always have problems with this sort of view: how can something play a role if it doesn't already have intrinsic properties to make the role possible?


The 13 ideas from 'A Study of Concepts'

Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]