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Single Idea 9338

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori ]

Full Idea

Quine's arguments provide no reason to doubt the existence of a priori knowledge outside the domain of science.

Gist of Idea

Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science

Source

comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Paul Horwich - Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority §10

Book Ref

'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.166


A Reaction

This rather ignores Quine's background view of thoroughgoing physicalism, so that the domain of science is the domain of nature, which is the domain of everything. See his naturalising of epistemology, for example. Maths is part of his science.


The 29 ideas from 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'

Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine]
Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine]
Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich]
Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine]
The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo]
'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine]
Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine]
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine]
It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine]
If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine]