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Single Idea 9340

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori ]

Full Idea

I think logic, arithmetic and geometry are subject to Quine's empirical revisability argument: quantum logic may turn out to be the best overall theory; so these things are justified a posteriori.

Clarification

Quantum logic is built on the uncertainties of quantum mechanics

Gist of Idea

Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right

Source

comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Paul Horwich - Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority §11

Book Ref

'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.168


A Reaction

Not much of an argument, because 'quantum logic' may also turn out to be a will-o'-the-whisp. Until it is established (which I doubt, because quantum theory is so poorly understood), I think we should be highly suspicious of the Quinean view.


The 11 ideas with the same theme [there is no possibility of real knowledge a priori]:

Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche]
No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein]
Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine]
Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich]
Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine]
What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie]
Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa]
The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
The failure of key assumptions in geometry, mereology and set theory throw doubt on the a priori [Hart,WD]
We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]