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Single Idea 9353
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
]
Full Idea
We have no need to turn to an a priori explanation of our knowledge of mathematics and logic. Our intuitions that this knowledge is not justified in some direct empirical way is preserved. It is justified in an indirect holistic way.
Gist of Idea
We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical
Source
Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §2)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology', ed/tr. Steup,M/Sosa,E [Blackwell 2005], p.107
A Reaction
I think this is roughly the right story, but the only way it will work is if we have some sort of theory of abstraction, which gets us up the ladder of generalisations to the ones which, it appears, are necessarily true.
The
15 ideas
from Michael Devitt
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17371
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Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all
[Devitt]
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17372
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The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up
[Devitt]
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17373
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Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is
[Devitt]
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8501
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Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have
[Devitt]
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8502
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Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness'
[Devitt]
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8503
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The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic
[Devitt]
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17369
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We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations
[Devitt]
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17370
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Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences
[Devitt]
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17367
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Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic
[Devitt, by PG]
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17368
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Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category
[Devitt]
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9354
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Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically
[Devitt]
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9353
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We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical
[Devitt]
|
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9356
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The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything
[Devitt]
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19564
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Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that
[Devitt]
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19565
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How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality?
[Devitt]
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