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Single Idea 9364
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
]
Full Idea
A name must represent some uniformity in experience or it names nothing.
Gist of Idea
Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing
Source
C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368)
Book Ref
Peirce,James,Dewey etc: 'Pragmatism - The Classic Writings', ed/tr. Thayer,H.S. [Hackett 1982], p.368
A Reaction
I like this because, in the quintessentially linguistic debate about the exact logical role of names, it reminds us that names arise because of the way reality is; they are not sui generis private games for logicians.
The
15 ideas
from C.I. Lewis
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5828
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Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension
[Lewis,CI]
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6556
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If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain
[Lewis,CI]
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21500
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We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another
[Lewis,CI]
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21498
|
Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set
[Lewis,CI]
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21501
|
If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted
[Lewis,CI]
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9357
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Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience
[Lewis,CI]
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9358
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There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth
[Lewis,CI]
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9362
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Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what
[Lewis,CI]
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9361
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We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction
[Lewis,CI]
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9363
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Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions
[Lewis,CI]
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9364
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Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing
[Lewis,CI]
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9365
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We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them
[Lewis,CI]
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7803
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Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then'
[Lewis,CI, by Girle]
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11002
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Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity
[Lewis,CI, by Read]
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7791
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The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5
[Lewis,CI, by Girle]
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