more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 9366

[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique ]

Full Idea

Quine's attack on analyticity devastated the philosophical programs that depend upon a notion of analyticity - specifically, the linguistic theory of necessary truth, and the analytic theory of a priori knowledge.

Gist of Idea

Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori

Source

report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §I

Book Ref

-: 'Nous' [-], p.1

A Reaction

Note that much more would be needed to complete Quine's aim of more or less eliminating both necessity and the a priori from his scientific philosophy. Quine was trying to complete a programme initiated by C.I. Lewis (q.v.).

The 17 ideas with the same theme [rejection of sharp distinction between real and verbal assertion]:

20959 Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher]
21763 When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate]
2515 Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege]
19050 Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine]
8900 In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
21338 I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine]
9366 Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
14473 Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
7321 The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
17737 The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
1622 Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
8201 The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]
20299 If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey]
14619 The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
15016 Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider]