more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 9366
[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
]
Full Idea
Quine's attack on analyticity devastated the philosophical programs that depend upon a notion of analyticity - specifically, the linguistic theory of necessary truth, and the analytic theory of a priori knowledge.
Gist of Idea
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori
Source
report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §I
Book Ref
-: 'Nous' [-], p.1
A Reaction
Note that much more would be needed to complete Quine's aim of more or less eliminating both necessity and the a priori from his scientific philosophy. Quine was trying to complete a programme initiated by C.I. Lewis (q.v.).
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[rejection of sharp distinction between real and verbal assertion]:
20959
|
Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject
[Schleiermacher]
|
21763
|
When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge
[Hegel, by Houlgate]
|
2515
|
Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way
[Katz on Frege]
|
19050
|
Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences
[Quine]
|
8900
|
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity
[Quine]
|
21338
|
I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage
[Quine]
|
9366
|
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori
[Quine, by Boghossian]
|
14473
|
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution
[Quine, by Thomasson]
|
7321
|
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best
[Miller,A on Quine]
|
8803
|
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language
[Davidson on Quine]
|
17737
|
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation
[Quine, by Jenkins]
|
1622
|
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'?
[Quine]
|
1624
|
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity
[Quine]
|
8201
|
The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction
[Quine]
|
20299
|
If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical?
[Rey]
|
14619
|
The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part?
[Fine,K]
|
15016
|
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention
[Sider]
|