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Single Idea 9369

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities ]

Full Idea

Isn't it overwhelmingly obvious that 'Either snow is white or it isn't' was true before anyone stipulated a meaning for it, and that it would have been true even if no one had thought about it, or chosen it to be expressed by one of our sentences?

Gist of Idea

'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation

Source

Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I)

Book Ref

-: 'Nous' [-], p.4

A Reaction

Boghossian would have to believe in propositions (unexpressed truths) to hold this - which he does. I take the notion of truth to only have relevance when there are minds around. Otherwise the so-called 'truths' are just the facts.

The 14 ideas from Paul Boghossian

17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
6345 Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]