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Full Idea
Conventualism is a factualist view: it presupposes that sentences of logic have truth values. It differs from a realist view in its conception of the source of those truth values, not on their existence. I call the denial of truths Non-Factualism.
Gist of Idea
Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source
Source
Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III)
Book Ref
-: 'Nous' [-], p.13
A Reaction
It barely seems to count as truth is we say 'p is true because we say so'. It is a truth about an agreement, not a truth about logic. Driving on the left isn't a truth about which side of the road is best.
| 5542 | There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant] |
| 10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
| 10613 | No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P] |
| 10819 | Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H] |
| 9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
| 10892 | We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo] |