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Single Idea 9375

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth ]

Full Idea

Conventualism is a factualist view: it presupposes that sentences of logic have truth values. It differs from a realist view in its conception of the source of those truth values, not on their existence. I call the denial of truths Non-Factualism.

Gist of Idea

Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source

Source

Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III)

Book Ref

-: 'Nous' [-], p.13

A Reaction

It barely seems to count as truth is we say 'p is true because we say so'. It is a truth about an agreement, not a truth about logic. Driving on the left isn't a truth about which side of the road is best.

The 14 ideas from Paul Boghossian

17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
6345 Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]