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Single Idea 9375
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
]
Full Idea
Conventualism is a factualist view: it presupposes that sentences of logic have truth values. It differs from a realist view in its conception of the source of those truth values, not on their existence. I call the denial of truths Non-Factualism.
Gist of Idea
Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source
Source
Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III)
Book Ref
-: 'Nous' [-], p.13
A Reaction
It barely seems to count as truth is we say 'p is true because we say so'. It is a truth about an agreement, not a truth about logic. Driving on the left isn't a truth about which side of the road is best.
The
14 ideas
from Paul Boghossian
17721
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There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding
[Boghossian, by Jenkins]
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9368
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Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning
[Boghossian]
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9369
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'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation
[Boghossian]
|
9367
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The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition
[Boghossian]
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9372
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Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same?
[Boghossian]
|
9378
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If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job?
[Boghossian]
|
9377
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'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences
[Boghossian]
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9373
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That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants
[Boghossian]
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9380
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We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it
[Boghossian]
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9376
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A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact
[Boghossian]
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9375
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Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source
[Boghossian]
|
9374
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If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long?
[Boghossian]
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9384
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We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory
[Boghossian]
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6345
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Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property
[Boghossian, by Horwich]
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