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Single Idea 9383

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic ]

Full Idea

Quine showed the vacuity of the metaphysical concept of analyticity and the futility of the underwritten project - the linguistic theory of necessity. But that doesn't effect the epistemic notion of analyticity needed for a priori knowledge.

Gist of Idea

Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori

Source

comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered Concl

Book Ref

-: 'Nous' [-], p.20

A Reaction

This summarise Boghossian's view, that a priori knowledge is still analytic, once we get clear about analyticity. See Idea 9368 for his two types of analyticity. Horwich attacks the view.

Related Idea

Idea 9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]

The 20 ideas with the same theme [a priori knowledge comes from the meanings of words]:

21250 A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas]
5525 No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant]
2514 Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz]
7088 Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
5204 To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer]
9383 Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
12424 Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
6284 If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam]
13975 Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames]
17048 Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke]
17052 The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
3089 Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman]
3088 Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman]
18263 The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa]
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
15165 A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle]
14704 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]