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Single Idea 9383

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic ]

Full Idea

Quine showed the vacuity of the metaphysical concept of analyticity and the futility of the underwritten project - the linguistic theory of necessity. But that doesn't effect the epistemic notion of analyticity needed for a priori knowledge.

Gist of Idea

Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori

Source

comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered Concl

Book Ref

-: 'Nous' [-], p.20

A Reaction

This summarise Boghossian's view, that a priori knowledge is still analytic, once we get clear about analyticity. See Idea 9368 for his two types of analyticity. Horwich attacks the view.

Related Idea

Idea 9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]

The 29 ideas from 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'

9204 Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
17738 Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine]
19492 Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
12188 Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
15090 Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
9383 Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
12424 Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
9338 Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine]
9337 Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich]
9340 Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine]
19488 The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo]
7317 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
9366 Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
14473 Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
7321 The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
17737 The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
9371 Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
10929 Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
1620 Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine]
1621 Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
1622 Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
1623 Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine]
1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
1625 Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine]
1626 It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
1627 Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine]
1628 If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
1629 Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine]