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Single Idea 9384

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori ]

Full Idea

It is consistent with a belief's being a priori in the strong sense that we should have pragmatic reasons for dropping it from our best overall theory.

Gist of Idea

We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory

Source

Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], n 6)

Book Ref

-: 'Nous' [-], p.21

A Reaction

Does 'dropping it' from the theory mean just ignoring it, or actually denying it? C.I. Lewis is the ancestor of this view. Could it be our 'best' theory, while conflicting with beliefs that were strongly a priori? Pragmatism can embrace falsehoods.

The 14 ideas from Paul Boghossian

17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
6345 Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]