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Full Idea
Since to belong, to belong of necessity, and to be possible to belong are different, ..there will be different deductions for each; one deduction will be from necessary terms, one from terms which belong, and one from possible terms.
Gist of Idea
There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms
Source
Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 29b29-35)
Book Ref
Aristotle: 'Prior Analytics', ed/tr. Smith,Robin [Hackett 1989], p.13
A Reaction
Fitting and Mendelsohn cite this as the earliest thoughts on modal logic. but Kneale and Kneale say that Aristotle got into a muddle, and so was unable to create a workable system.
| 9403 | There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle] |
| 9470 | Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C] |
| 16456 | For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
| 14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
| 7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette] |
| 8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
| 9404 | Modality affects content, because P→◊P is valid, but ◊P→P isn't [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
| 7787 | Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle] |
| 7788 | Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle] |
| 7796 | Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle] |