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Full Idea
If there are laws that are instantiated in no particulars, then this would seem to favour the theory that laws connect universals rather than particulars.
Gist of Idea
If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals
Source
Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 06.4)
Book Ref
Mumford,Stephen: 'Laws in Nature' [Routledge 2006], p.90
A Reaction
There is a dispute here between the Platonic view of uninstantiated universals (Tooley) and the Aristotelian instantiated view (Armstrong). Mumford and I prefer the dispositional account.
| 8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
| 16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
| 9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
| 15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
| 15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
| 15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |
| 9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
| 9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
| 9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
| 9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
| 19039 | The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter] |