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Single Idea 9437

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences ]

Full Idea

Where properties are possessed by all kind members, we must distinguish the accidental from essential ones by considering all actual and possible kind members.

Gist of Idea

To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds

Source

Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.5)

Book Ref

Mumford,Stephen: 'Laws in Nature' [Routledge 2006], p.117

A Reaction

This is why we must treat possibilities as features of the actual world.

The 24 ideas from 'Laws in Nature'

9408 Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford]
9411 There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford]
9412 You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford]
9415 Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford]
9416 Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford]
9422 If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford]
9421 The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford]
9427 For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford]
9429 Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford]
9430 Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
9431 Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford]
9432 Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford]
9433 If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford]
9434 Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford]
9435 A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
9437 To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford]
12248 How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford]
9439 The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford]
9441 Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford]
9443 It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
9444 There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford]
9445 We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford]
9446 Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford]
9447 If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]