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Full Idea
In extensionalist semantics only existent objects can be referred to, ...but in everyday thought and discourse we regularly and apparently without undue confusion speak about nonexistent objects.
Gist of Idea
Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects
Source
Dale Jacquette (Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic' [2002], §4)
Book Ref
'Philosophy of Logic: an anthology', ed/tr. Jacquette,Dale [Blackwell 2002], p.5
A Reaction
This is the reason why Meinong, whose views are presented by Russell as absurd, are undergoing a revival. The full-blown view will even treat 'round squares' as objects about which we can reason - and why not? Don't open a shop which sells them.
| 9456 | Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette] |
| 9457 | The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette] |
| 9461 | Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette] |
| 9458 | Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette] |
| 9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette] |
| 9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette] |