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Full Idea
Modal logic is not an extensional language.
Gist of Idea
Modal logic is not an extensional language
Source
Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.159 n8)
Book Ref
'Philosophy of Logic: an anthology', ed/tr. Jacquette,Dale [Blackwell 2002], p.159
A Reaction
[I record this for investigation. Possible worlds seem to contain objects]
| 9403 | There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle] |
| 9470 | Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C] |
| 16456 | For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
| 14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
| 7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette] |
| 8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
| 9404 | Modality affects content, because P→◊P is valid, but ◊P→P isn't [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
| 7787 | Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle] |
| 7788 | Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle] |
| 7796 | Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle] |