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Single Idea 9475
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
]
Full Idea
If a robust iron pot is attached to a bomb with a sensitive detonator. If the pot is struck, the bomb will go off, so they counterfactual 'if the pot were struck it would break' is true, but it is not a fragile pot. This is a 'mimic' of the disposition.
Gist of Idea
A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break
Source
Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 2.2.5.1)
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.29
A Reaction
A very nice example, showing that a true disposition would have to be an internal feature (a power) of the pot itself, not a mere disposition to behave. The problem is these pesky empiricists, who want to reduce it all to what is observable.
The
34 ideas
from 'Nature's Metaphysics'
14540
|
Only real powers are fundamental
[Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
|
23713
|
Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers
[Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
|
9450
|
If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress
[Bird]
|
9449
|
The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world
[Bird]
|
9507
|
Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences
[Bird]
|
9473
|
Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals
[Bird]
|
9472
|
Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common
[Bird]
|
9474
|
A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out
[Bird]
|
9475
|
A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break
[Bird]
|
9477
|
Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds
[Bird]
|
9482
|
If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity
[Bird]
|
9481
|
Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility
[Bird]
|
9479
|
Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities
[Bird]
|
9484
|
If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law
[Bird]
|
9486
|
Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular?
[Bird]
|
9487
|
We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B
[Bird]
|
9488
|
Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties
[Bird]
|
9489
|
Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions
[Bird]
|
9490
|
The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself
[Bird]
|
9491
|
Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence
[Bird]
|
9493
|
We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation
[Bird]
|
9494
|
Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws
[Bird]
|
9495
|
If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it
[Bird]
|
9496
|
That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is
[Bird]
|
9492
|
Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them
[Bird]
|
9498
|
The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration
[Bird]
|
9499
|
Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions
[Bird]
|
9501
|
If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects
[Bird]
|
9500
|
If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched
[Bird]
|
9502
|
There might be just one fundamental natural property
[Bird]
|
9503
|
To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate
[Bird]
|
9504
|
The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be
[Bird]
|
9505
|
Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote
[Bird]
|
9506
|
Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible
[Bird]
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