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Single Idea 9476
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
]
Full Idea
Maybe a disposition is a more fundamental notion than a cause, in which case Lewis has from the very start erred in seeking a causal analysis, in a traditional, conceptual sense, of disposition terms.
Gist of Idea
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them
Source
comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 2.2.8
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.37
A Reaction
Is this right about Lewis? I see him as reducing both dispositions and causes to a set of bald facts, which exist in possible and actual worlds. Conditionals and counterfactuals also suffer the same fate.
The
39 ideas
with the same theme
[powers seen as the foundation of physical reality]:
15773
|
Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process
[Aristotle]
|
11387
|
The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia]
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
18451
|
The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition
[Porphyry]
|
16635
|
Incorporeal substances are powers or forces
[Descartes, by Pasnau]
|
17195
|
Things persevere through a force which derives from God
[Spinoza]
|
17011
|
I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces
[Newton]
|
12710
|
As well as extension, bodies contain powers
[Leibniz]
|
12965
|
All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action'
[Leibniz]
|
12999
|
Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers
[Leibniz]
|
13079
|
A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth
[Leibniz]
|
12749
|
Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances
[Leibniz]
|
12708
|
The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty
[Leibniz]
|
12723
|
The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions
[Leibniz]
|
23664
|
Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined
[Reid]
|
23669
|
Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon
[Reid]
|
23228
|
The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force
[Fichte]
|
17534
|
A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality
[Heisenberg]
|
14329
|
Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base
[Price,HH]
|
15487
|
If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties
[Martin,CB]
|
12676
|
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power
[Ellis]
|
15218
|
Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions
[Harré/Madden]
|
15302
|
We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers
[Harré/Madden]
|
15303
|
Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers
[Harré/Madden]
|
9476
|
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them
[Bird on Lewis]
|
11934
|
The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality
[Molnar]
|
11947
|
Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects
[Molnar]
|
11952
|
The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers
[Molnar]
|
11953
|
Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative
[Molnar]
|
16556
|
Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does
[Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
14294
|
Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties
[Mumford]
|
9446
|
Properties are just natural clusters of powers
[Mumford]
|
17996
|
Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure
[Psillos]
|
15127
|
A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own
[Hawthorne]
|
14540
|
Only real powers are fundamental
[Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
|
23771
|
Fundamental physics describes everything in terms of powers
[Williams,NE]
|
12467
|
Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature
[Jacobs]
|
14555
|
Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
22632
|
Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality
[Ingthorsson]
|
23714
|
Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers
[Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
|