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Single Idea 9476
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
]
Full Idea
Maybe a disposition is a more fundamental notion than a cause, in which case Lewis has from the very start erred in seeking a causal analysis, in a traditional, conceptual sense, of disposition terms.
Gist of Idea
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them
Source
comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 2.2.8
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.37
A Reaction
Is this right about Lewis? I see him as reducing both dispositions and causes to a set of bald facts, which exist in possible and actual worlds. Conditionals and counterfactuals also suffer the same fate.
The
15 ideas
from 'Causation'
9476
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If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them
[Bird on Lewis]
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8405
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A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted
[Lewis, by Field,H]
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10392
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It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause
[Lewis]
|
17525
|
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects
[Lewis, by Bird]
|
17524
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Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption)
[Lewis, by Bird]
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8397
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Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't
[Tooley on Lewis]
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4795
|
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter
[Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
|
8419
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The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions
[Lewis]
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8420
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A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true
[Lewis]
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8421
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Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted
[Lewis]
|
8423
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My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations
[Lewis]
|
8424
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Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ
[Lewis]
|
8425
|
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality
[Lewis]
|
8426
|
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second
[Lewis]
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8427
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I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted
[Lewis]
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