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Single Idea 9476

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic ]

Full Idea

Maybe a disposition is a more fundamental notion than a cause, in which case Lewis has from the very start erred in seeking a causal analysis, in a traditional, conceptual sense, of disposition terms.

Gist of Idea

If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them

Source

comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 2.2.8

Book Ref

Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.37

A Reaction

Is this right about Lewis? I see him as reducing both dispositions and causes to a set of bald facts, which exist in possible and actual worlds. Conditionals and counterfactuals also suffer the same fate.

The 15 ideas from 'Causation'

9476 If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
8405 A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
10392 It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
17525 The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
17524 Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
8397 Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
4795 Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
8419 The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
8420 A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
8421 Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
8423 My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
8424 Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
8425 For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
8426 One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
8427 I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]