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Full Idea
If universals exist only where and when they are instantiated, this make serious trouble for the universals view of laws. It would be most odd if a particular, merely by changing its properties, could cause a law to go out of existence.
Gist of Idea
If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law
Source
Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.2.2)
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.52
A Reaction
This sounds conclusive. He notes that this is probably why Armstrong does not adopt this view (though Lowe seems to favour it). Could there be a possible property (and concomitant law) which was never ever instantiated?
| 8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
| 16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
| 9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
| 15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
| 15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
| 15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |
| 9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
| 9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
| 9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
| 9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
| 19039 | The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter] |