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Full Idea
If universals exist only where and when they are instantiated, this make serious trouble for the universals view of laws. It would be most odd if a particular, merely by changing its properties, could cause a law to go out of existence.
Gist of Idea
If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law
Source
Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.2.2)
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.52
A Reaction
This sounds conclusive. He notes that this is probably why Armstrong does not adopt this view (though Lowe seems to favour it). Could there be a possible property (and concomitant law) which was never ever instantiated?