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Single Idea 9484

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals ]

Full Idea

If universals exist only where and when they are instantiated, this make serious trouble for the universals view of laws. It would be most odd if a particular, merely by changing its properties, could cause a law to go out of existence.

Gist of Idea

If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law

Source

Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.2.2)

Book Ref

Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.52

A Reaction

This sounds conclusive. He notes that this is probably why Armstrong does not adopt this view (though Lowe seems to favour it). Could there be a possible property (and concomitant law) which was never ever instantiated?

The 34 ideas from 'Nature's Metaphysics'

14540 Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
23713 Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
9450 If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
9449 The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird]
9507 Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird]
9473 Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird]
9472 Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird]
9474 A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird]
9475 A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird]
9477 Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird]
9482 If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird]
9481 Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird]
9479 Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird]
9486 Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird]
9484 If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird]
9487 We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird]
9488 Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird]
9489 Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird]
9490 The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
9491 Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird]
9493 We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird]
9494 Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird]
9495 If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird]
9496 That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird]
9492 Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird]
9498 The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
9499 Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird]
9501 If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird]
9500 If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird]
9502 There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird]
9503 To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird]
9504 The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird]
9505 Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird]
9506 Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird]