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Full Idea
An instantiation condition seems to be a failure of nerve as regards realism about universals. If universals really are entities in their own right, why should their existence depend upon a relationship with existing particulars?
Gist of Idea
Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular?
Source
Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.2.2)
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.55
A Reaction
I like this challenge, which seems to leave fans of universals no option but full-blown Platonism, which most of them recognise as being deeply implausible.
| 11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
| 12094 | No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle] |
| 17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
| 17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| 15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
| 10724 | Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver] |
| 7963 | Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver] |
| 10730 | If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver] |
| 4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
| 10197 | An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW] |
| 9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |