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Full Idea
The straightforward dispositional essentialist account of laws by subjunctive conditionals is false because dispositions typically suffer from finks and antidotes.
Clarification
Subjunctive conditionals say 'If x were the case..'
Gist of Idea
Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions
Source
Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.4)
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.64
A Reaction
[Finks and antidotes intervene before a disposition can take effect] This seems very persuasive to me, and shows why you can't just explain laws as counterfactual or conditional claims. Explanation demands what underlies them.
| 15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
| 4398 | An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
| 4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
| 4788 | Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos] |
| 4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
| 4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |
| 9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |