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Single Idea 9490

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties ]

Full Idea

In the categoricalist view, the essential properties of a natural property are limited to its essentially being itself and not some distinct property.

Gist of Idea

The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself

Source

Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.1)

Book Ref

Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.67

A Reaction

He associates this view with Lewis (modern regularity view) and Armstrong (nomic necessitation), and launches a splendid attack against it. I have always laughed at the idea that 'being Socrates' was one of the properties of Socrates.

The 29 ideas with the same theme [actualised properties, rather than conditional ones]:

11032 Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
11038 We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
9478 Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
12677 Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis]
12665 I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
12682 Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
12684 Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
5469 The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis]
13577 Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis]
9436 The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis]
3430 Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim]
15464 The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
7031 Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
11956 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar]
6520 If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H]
4617 A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil]
18522 Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil]
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
14315 Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
14332 There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
14336 Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
14194 Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]
9477 Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird]
9490 The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
9495 If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird]
9492 Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird]
14501 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki]
16733 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau]