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Single Idea 9490
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
]
Full Idea
In the categoricalist view, the essential properties of a natural property are limited to its essentially being itself and not some distinct property.
Gist of Idea
The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself
Source
Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.1)
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.67
A Reaction
He associates this view with Lewis (modern regularity view) and Armstrong (nomic necessitation), and launches a splendid attack against it. I have always laughed at the idea that 'being Socrates' was one of the properties of Socrates.
The
29 ideas
with the same theme
[actualised properties, rather than conditional ones]:
11032
|
Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject
[Aristotle]
|
11038
|
We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances
[Aristotle]
|
9478
|
Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates
[Armstrong, by Bird]
|
12677
|
Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical
[Armstrong, by Ellis]
|
12665
|
I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers
[Ellis]
|
12682
|
Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions
[Ellis]
|
12684
|
Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal
[Ellis]
|
5469
|
The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions
[Ellis]
|
13577
|
Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape
[Ellis]
|
9436
|
The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it
[Ellis]
|
3430
|
Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property
[Kim]
|
15464
|
The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion
[Lewis]
|
7031
|
Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects
[Lewis, by Heil]
|
8572
|
Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant
[Lewis]
|
11956
|
'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers
[Molnar]
|
6520
|
If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features?
[Robinson,H]
|
4617
|
A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone
[Heil]
|
18522
|
Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties
[Heil]
|
4027
|
Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ
[Mellor/Oliver]
|
14315
|
Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another
[Mumford]
|
14332
|
There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental
[Mumford]
|
14336
|
Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions
[Mumford]
|
14194
|
Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones
[Sider]
|
9477
|
Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds
[Bird]
|
9490
|
The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself
[Bird]
|
9495
|
If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it
[Bird]
|
9492
|
Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them
[Bird]
|
14501
|
'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds
[Koslicki]
|
16733
|
17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions
[Pasnau]
|