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Single Idea 9494
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
]
Full Idea
While singularists about causation might think that a particular has its causal powers independently of law, it is difficult to see how a universal could have or confer causal powers without generating what we would naturally think of as a law.
Gist of Idea
Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws
Source
Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.2.1 n71)
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.71
A Reaction
This is a middle road between the purely singularist account (Anscombe) and the fully nomological account. We might say that a caused event will be 'involved in law-like behaviour', without attributing the cause to a law.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[causes as aspects of lawlike behaviour]:
634
|
Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement
[Aristotle]
|
9755
|
The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction
[Kant, by Korsgaard]
|
17709
|
We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature
[Kant, by Mares]
|
5562
|
Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws
[Kant]
|
8374
|
We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes
[Ducasse]
|
8395
|
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones
[Mackie, by Tooley]
|
8334
|
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause
[Mackie]
|
4778
|
A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law
[Davidson, by Psillos]
|
3962
|
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws
[Davidson]
|
3401
|
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law
[Kim]
|
8442
|
What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence?
[Sosa]
|
8394
|
Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation
[Tooley]
|
8398
|
Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process
[Tooley]
|
8325
|
The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly
[Sosa/Tooley]
|
2962
|
Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind
[Lockwood]
|
7016
|
The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events
[Heil]
|
4213
|
Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities)
[Lowe]
|
3528
|
Causality may require that a law is being followed
[Maslin]
|
9430
|
Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law
[Mumford]
|
4402
|
Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law
[Psillos]
|
9494
|
Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws
[Bird]
|
6753
|
Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes
[Bird]
|