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Single Idea 9494

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation ]

Full Idea

While singularists about causation might think that a particular has its causal powers independently of law, it is difficult to see how a universal could have or confer causal powers without generating what we would naturally think of as a law.

Gist of Idea

Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws

Source

Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.2.1 n71)

Book Ref

Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.71


A Reaction

This is a middle road between the purely singularist account (Anscombe) and the fully nomological account. We might say that a caused event will be 'involved in law-like behaviour', without attributing the cause to a law.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [causes as aspects of lawlike behaviour]:

Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle]
The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard]
We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares]
Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant]
We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim]
What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa]
Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley]
Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley]
The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]
Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood]
The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil]
Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe]
Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin]
Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos]
Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird]
Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes [Bird]