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Single Idea 9570

[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory ]

Full Idea

Field commits himself to a Platonic view of mathematics. The theorems of set theory are held to imply or presuppose the existence of things that don't in fact exist. That is why he believes that these theorems are false.

Gist of Idea

In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things

Source

report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 11.1

Book Ref

Chihara,Charles: 'A Structural Account of Mathematics' [OUP 2004], p.318


A Reaction

I am sympathetic to Field, but this sounds wrong. A response that looks appealing is that maths is hypothetical ('if-thenism') - the truth is in the logical consequences, not in the ontological presuppositions.


The 23 ideas with the same theme [objections to the whole idea of set theory]:

Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell]
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead]
Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna]
Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell]
Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem]
Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
Von Neumann wanted mathematical functions to replace sets [Neumann, by Benardete,JA]
Two objects can apparently make up quite distinct arrangements in sets [Goodman, by Burgess/Rosen]
Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
What in the real world could ground the distinction between the sets {A,{A,B}} and {B,{A,B}}? [Inwagen]
In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara]
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
Maybe sets should be rethought in terms of the even more basic categories [Hart,WD]
God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil]
Anti-realists reject set theory [Shapiro]
We could talk of open sentences, instead of sets [Chihara, by Shapiro]
Could we replace sets by the open sentences that define them? [Chihara, by Bostock]
A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara]
As a reduction of arithmetic, set theory is not fully general, and so not logical [George/Velleman]
Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack]