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Single Idea 9584
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
]
Full Idea
The relation of sameness remains puzzling to a psychological logician. They cannot say 'A is the same as B', because that requires distinguishing A from B, so that these would have to be different presentations.
Gist of Idea
Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them
Source
Gottlob Frege (Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic' [1894], p.327)
Book Ref
-: 'Mind July 1972' [-], p.327
A Reaction
This is why Frege needed the concept of reference, so that identity could be outside the mind (as in Hesperus = Phosophorus). Think about an electron; now think about a different electron.
The
15 ideas
from 'Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic''
9821
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A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right
[Frege, by Dummett]
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17446
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Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects
[Frege]
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9577
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The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap
[Frege]
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9578
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If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties
[Frege]
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9580
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Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them
[Frege]
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9579
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Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference?
[Frege]
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9581
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Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation
[Frege]
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9582
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Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves
[Frege]
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9583
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Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference
[Frege]
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9584
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Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them
[Frege]
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9585
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Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself
[Frege]
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9586
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In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept
[Frege]
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9587
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How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics
[Frege]
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9588
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Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them!
[Frege]
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9589
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Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective
[Frege]
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