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Single Idea 9597

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence ]

Full Idea

There is extensive 'armchair knowledge' in which experience plays no strictly evidential role, but it may not fit the stereotype of the a priori, because the contribution of experience was more than enabling, such as armchair truths about our environment.

Gist of Idea

There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved

Source

Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.5)

Book Ref

Williamson,Timothy: 'The Philosophy of Philosophy' [Blackwell 2007], p.169


A Reaction

Once this point is conceded we have no idea where to draw the line. Does 'if it is red it can't be green' derive from experience? I think it might.


The 13 ideas from 'The Philosophy of Philosophy'

Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]